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Representations and Discourse about Religion and Chinese 
Descendants in 2012 Jakarta’s Election 
 
Idhamsyah Eka Putra 
Persada Indonesia University, Jakarta, Indonesia 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyze rhetorical rejections from Muslims, a 
majority group, who refused a non-Muslim Chinese candidate in the 2012 
Jakarta gubernatorial election. The study focuses to explore (1) the social 
representations of the Chinese and how it was used to attack the Chinese 
candidate and (2) a construction process of a “new” social representation on 
how a religious teaching was constructed to have nothing to do with negative 
sentiments or hatred. The field study focused on analyzing the sequential 
events related to the sermon of a prominent Islamic figure, his denial of the 
hate contents in his sermon, and the support he received from his Muslim 
supporters. The results showed that when the Chinese are negatively 
represented, a Chinese is considered unfit to lead Jakarta as he may disgrace 
the nation. Moreover, it is found that when a rhetorical rejection toward a 
non-Muslim is supported by a religious teaching, such rejection is considered 
not related to negative sentiments. Keywords: Prejudice, Social Identity, 
Social Representations, Hate Speech  
  
Q: What do you think about your Chinese (descendant) friend, can we call 
her/him as Indonesian? 
 
A: Not really. She/he is Chinese, so …Yeah... She/he is a half Indonesian. (F: 
12) 
 
I began this paper with the quotation above to show how Chinese descendants are 
currently categorized in Indonesia, even though they have been living in Indonesia for 
centuries. The question was asked to a 6th grade elementary school girl when we had dinner 
together at a family gathering in 2011. Indonesia is a country with hundreds of ethnicities, 
cultures, and languages, united since 1928 through the use of Bahasa Indonesia as the 
unifying language. However, the quotation above illustrates that not all ethnicities, cultures, 
and religions are accepted as part of Indonesia; for example the Chinese descendants who 
currently live in Indonesia. In effect of this, discrimination toward the Chinese emerged 
almost in all provinces of Indonesia. Regardless of “their diverse origins, spoken language, 
number of generations since arriving in Indonesia, or mixing with non-Chinese, they became 
increasingly as a single category of ‘Chinese’” (Betrand, 2004, p. 45). In this paper, I call the 
Chinese descendants as the Chinese as in Indonesia the use of the word “Cina” which literally 
translates as Chinese/China, refers to the Chinese decendants. 
Discrimination toward minority groups is a phenomenon not unique to Indonesia; 
rather it occurs in every place. However, nowadays explicit discrimination and prejudice are 
normatively forbidden through which it has led to a new style of prejudicing; prejudice occur 
in more implicit or hidden ways (Durrheim, 2012). In this matter, in order to cover hatred 
toward a certain group, a racist may show reasons why he/she hates or discriminate the 
outgroup members. These reasons, then, can make him/her to avoid moral sanctions and deny 
prejudicing.  
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The contents of the reasons are contextual and depend on the situation that occurred. 
For examples, it can be from survey results informing that in USA, the numbers of crime 
rates within black people are higher compared to white people, in which the results are used 
by a white rental owner to reject black people to rent the apartment. It can also be from 
knowledge developed in a white European community describing that immigrants are 
troublemakers; hence aids toward immigrants are considered not necessary. Other that those 
examples, there are of course reasons used to deny prejudice or hatred. Any other findings of 
such denial are important in order to develop intergroup tolerance.  
Little, if anything, is known about the political discourse and denial of hatred within 
religious groups and in a place where religion is considered important. Indonesia is a country 
that put religion as an important factor. Given this description, this paper focuses on 
analyzing the political rhetoric of rejecting a non-Muslim Chinese candidate in 2012 
gubernatorial election in Jakarta; in particular whether or not the rejection should be viewed 
as constituting negative sentiment. I analyzed the case by using social representations 
approach (Elcheroth, Doise, & Reicher, 2011), because this approach can help to understand 
world-making representations about who is the Chinese and what is called religiosity in 
everyday public discourse (Wagner & Hayes, 2005). 
 
Representations and Discourse of Hate Speech, Prejudice, and Religion 
 
Hate speech is a speech that attacks, insults, or mocks a person or a group based on 
social attributes such as religion, ethnicity, race, or gender (Leader, Mullen, & Rice, 2009). In 
many countries, hate speech is forbidden as it is considered to influence prejudicial actions 
and intergroup hostilities.  
But who can be called as a hate speaker, prejudiced, or racist? Research conducted by 
Dovidio and Gaertner (2004) show that in USA, most White Americans cannot recognize 
their own prejudices. Some of them tend to associate prejudice to the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), 
where people in white robes are burning people on crosses (O’Brien, Crandall, Horstman-
Reser, Warner, 2010). Even when their thinking and act relate to anti-black sentiments, White 
Americans often do not consider themselves as racist (Feagin & Vera, 1995). It appears that 
what is considered as prejudiced depends on the social representations of prejudice, that is, 
the public’s consensual understanding of what constitutes prejudice within a certain context 
or group (O’Brien et al., 2010; Moscovici & Perez, 1997). 
Social representation (Moscovici 1961/2008) is understood as a system of knowledge 
that guides individuals of what to think and what to do. It gives people the ability to cultivate 
ideas on how they should communicate with others. In social interaction, people can 
communicate with each other because they have a mutual core of ideas which represent 
something they shared. This shared knowledge is constructed, communicated, and discoursed 
in the interactions of group members (Wagner, 1995, 1998).  
More often, social representations approach interrelate social representations and 
social identity phenomena. It is because “identity is crucial to social representation: without 
this concept we cannot explain why particular people have different perspectives, draw on 
particular representations, defend them in the ways they do, and why other representations 
are ignored or contested” (Howarth, 2014, pp. 4.2-4.3).  In this paper, social identity is 
defined as a reflexive group “where the members know their affiliation and have criteria 
available to decide who else is also a member” (Wagner, 1995, p. 127). Taking this 
perspective seriously, researching representations of a certain social object and how it is 
constructed would mean to observe the content of the representations that is “being enacted 
by social actors through their situated discourse and other activity” (Wagner, Mecha, & 
Carvalho, 2003, p. 33) 
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In my understanding, discourse is any talking or writing of a topic in a social context 
(van Dijk, 2000), that is situated and action-oriented. It is situated because “talk and texts are 
embedded in some kind of sequence of interaction and in some kind of context” (Potter & 
Edwards, 2001, p. 104). It is action-oriented because people do things with words and present 
themselves to others in specific ways; often “some discrete set of words correspond to a 
discrete act” (Potter & Edwards, 2001, p. 105).  
As considered to have common background knowledge, group members are able to 
locate themselves within a common discursive space (Wagner, 1995). In the communication 
about a discourse, group members play as producers as well as recipients of the knowledge 
system. This discourse in groups, then, can lead to a construction of a new social 
representation (Wagner, 1998).   
In Indonesia, religion has a significant contribution in many aspects of life such as in 
politics, economic, and culture. In politics, at least one of Islamic political parties is always in 
the top five. “Belief in God” is placed as one of Indonesia’s state ideological pillars, 
Pancasila (Mashuri, Supriyono, Khotimah, Sakdiah, Sukmawati, & Zaduqisti, 2014). 
Usually, religious people are understood as “good people” whereas unreligious people are 
perceived otherwise. In fact, atheism is forbidden in Indonesia. Given this description, it is 
plausible that, in certain groups, any such discourse related to religion is represented as 
morally good. 
In some regards, Indonesian politicians can use religious elements as a tool to tackle 
their political opponents. Some members of the majority Muslims, for example, might raise 
issues that non-Muslims are not allowed to lead a region where the majority of the residents 
are Muslims. As a matter of fact, this situation occurred in Jakarta, the capital city of 
Indonesia, where religious elements were used as a tool to reject a non-Muslim Chinese 
candidate. A prominent cleric, Rhoma Irama, and his supporters persuaded Muslims living in 
Jakarta to not vote for the Chinese candidate. One of his sermons had been accused of having 
negative sentiments targeting the Chinese candidate; yet, it was then denied and recognized 
as religious sermon per se. Therefore, this paper aims to explore how representations about 
the Chinese and religiosity are discussed and constructed in an event of political campaign for 
Jakarta’s gubernatorial election. Denial of racism and prejudice is not a new phenomenon. 
However, to the best of my knowledge, analyzing such denial on the basis of religious 
elements is relatively new.  
 
The Categorization of Indigenous - Non-Indigenous and Its Representations in 
Indonesia 
 
Indonesians commonly define the Chinese as non-indigenous. Indigenous groups of 
Indonesia (native Indonesians) refer to cultures, ethnic traditions, and languages originating 
from a specific place in Indonesia. Indonesia, which consists of five large islands (i.e., 
Sumatera, Kalimantan, West Papua, Sulawesi, and Java) and thousands of smaller islands, 
has natives representing the majority of the population. Because Islam is the largest religion, 
Muslim-indigenous groups tend to dominate and stand out in political and cultural life. Based 
on a 2000 population census (Suryadinata, Arifin, & Ananta, 2003), in general the largest 
ethnic group in Indonesia is Javanese (around 83. 87 million/42.71%) and followed by 
Sundanese (30.98 million/15.41%). The population of the Chinese is about 1.74 million or 
about 0.86%. Compared to other ethnicities such as Acehnese, Nias, Sasak, and Ambon, the 
population of the Chinese is actually higher. It is reported that in 1930 the Chinese was the 
sixth largest ethnic group, but the fifteenth in 2000. In Jakarta, the Chinese (460 
thousand/5.53%) make up the fourth largest ethnic group after Javanese (2.93 
million/35.16%), Betawi—the indigenous ethnic group of Jakarta (2.30 million/ 27.65%), and 
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Sundanese (1.27 million/15.27%). However, because their tradition, culture, and language are 
perceived to originate from outside of Indonesia, the Chinese are considered as a non-native 
Indonesian group.  
In Indonesia, in places where Muslims are the majority, the use of a “Chinese calling” 
refers to both the non-indigeneous and non-Muslims. When talking about the Chinese, it will 
always refer to non-Muslim Chinese. If the religion of the Chinese is Islam, usually the 
Chinese will be attributed as Cina Islam (i.e., Muslim-Chinese). However, in places where 
the composition of Muslims and non-Muslims is equal or Muslims are the minority, the 
Chinese are simply referred to as non-indigenous, an attribute that is only categorized for the 
Indonesian Chinese (Betrand, 2004).  
Social exclusions toward the Chinese emerged almost in all provinces of Indonesia 
(Betrand, 2004). Often, the exclusion caused the Chinese to suffer violent attacks (Setiono, 
2002). The last major incident related to non-indigenous sentiment occurred in May1998. The 
collapse of Indonesian economy in 1997 had caused civil unrest which led to overthrow the 
regime of Soeharto, who ruled Indonesia for 32 years. Mass riots emerged in several cities on 
May 13-14, 1998 and took a toll on the Chinese people (Min, 2006; Tay, 2006). On the 
contrary, most of the stores owned by the indigenous were protected from the incidents by 
displaying signboards written with “milik pribumi” (owned by indigenous). 
However, in 2001, Abdurrahman Wahid or Gus Dur, the 4th President of Indonesia 
and also known as a prominent Islamic leader, realized that the previous discrimination 
policies toward the Chinese were unprecedented. In the Gus Dur era, the policies constraining 
the Chinese tradition were removed and the label of the second class citizen was recalled.  
Moreover, because it is considered as a stigma, the “Chinese” calling has been 
replaced with “Tionghoa.” Despite the inclusion of “Tionghoa” as a regular rule for formal 
language, in everyday life the Chinese calling is still frequently used (Putra & Pitaloka, 
2012). Thus, I expect that a Chinese candidate will face tough challenges from Muslims who 
still perceive the Chinese in a negative frame. 
 
The Setting: Jakarta Election 2012 
 
Jakarta is the capital city of Indonesia, with Islam (85%) as the largest religion 
followed by Christianity (10%). In 2012, Jakarta held its second direct election for governor 
and vice governor. One of the candidates, Joko Widodo (popularly known as Jokowi), 
embraced Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (famously known by his Chinese name, Ahok), who is a 
non-Muslim Chinese, to be his deputy. Although it was the first time for Jakarta residents to 
vote for a non-indigenous-Muslim candidate, it was not the first time that a Chinese leads 
Jakarta. During President Soekarno’s era (1945-1966), a Chinese descendant, Henk Gantung, 
had been directly appointed as Jakarta governor by the President in 1964 but only lasted for a 
year when Soekarno was overthrown in September 1965 which caused a regime change from 
Soekarno’s to Soeharto’s (1966-1998). Nonetheless, after Henk Gantung, Jakarta limited the 
Chinese involvement in politics. It was not until 2001 that Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), 
the fourth President of Indonesia, reinstated the possibility of political involvement for the 
Chinese. 
Before the election date, most survey institutes predicted that the incumbent Fauzi 
Bowo-Nachrowi would hold the top position (Rejeki, 2012). However, the result of the 
election was both surprising and unpredicted. From four pairs of candidates, Jokowi and 
Ahok won the most votes during the first round of the election. The competition became 
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heated and unhealthy in the second round of the election when there were only two pairs of 
candidates left, the incumbent Fauzi Bowo-Nachrowi versus Jokowi-Ahok1.  
In this second round of the election, one of the supporters of the incumbent pair, 
Rhoma Irama (a dangdut singer and a prominent Islamic cleric) asked Muslims not to vote 
for Ahok, the Chinese candidate. He utilized a mosque as a place to persuade other Muslims 
and used the Quran’s messages to strengthen his rationale for rejection. Irama’s sermon, 






The data collection focused on three events: (1) the moment when Rhoma Irama was 
delivering his sermon, (2) the moment when Rhoma Irama was summoned to the Election 
Supervisory Committee (Panwaslu) to give a clarification about his sermon, and (3) the 
moment after Rhoma Irama was relieved from allegation of delivering negative sentiments. 
Archival data were obtained from open sources data on the internet. Hence, the data 
can be seen as public behavior through which ethically is acceptable to be scientifically 
analyzed (see Holtz, Kronberger, & Wagner, 2012). First is Rhoma Irama’s sermon (in the 
extraction will be referred to as RI 1), which was collected from YouTube2. Second, I 
collected a report from Kompas news (2012) regarding Rhoma Irama’s objection to 
accusation against his sermon (in the extraction it will be referred to as RI 2; Retrieved from 
Afifah, 2012). Third, in order to report the demonstration supporting Rhoma Irama, I 
collected data from Rima News (2012), twicsy.com (2012), merdeka.com (2012), 
vivanews.com (Affandi, 2012), and kabarkampus.com (Sazli, 2012). Fourth, I reported two 
persons’ statements and interview; Abdul Rasyid Abdullah Syafi’i and Saharudin Daming 
which were obtained from online mass media. I reported Syafi’i as his statement represents 
the 11 clerics who supported Rhoma Irama (in the extraction it will be referred to as ARAS 1; 
Retrieved from Ratna, 2012). Saharudin Daming’s interview was used to represent one of the 
many Muslims who work in National Committee of Human Rights (in the extraction it will 
be referred as SD 1; Retrieved from Hidayat, 2012) and supported Rhoma Irama. All data 
were collected pertaining to support of Rhoma Irama’s rhetoric which state that his religious 
sermon has nothing to do with negative sentiment. The data were identified and selected for 




The tool used for analyzing discourse about religious activities in the middle of 
gubernatorial campaign was social representations approach (see Elcheroth et al., 2011; 
Kadianaki & Andreouli, 2015). In particular, social representations approach was used to 
understand the process of world-making representations about the differentiation between 
hate speech and religious sermon. That is, how a negative sentiment toward a member of an 
outgroup delivered in a religious sermon is represented as something unrelated to hatred. 
                                                 
1  The first re-election was held on 11 July 2012, and the second round of re-election had been held on 20 
September 2012. 
2 The sermon was videotaped and uploaded on YouTube. It can be found in YouTube: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KiYEc2z30mo. Soon after, the sermon became a fierce public debate on 
whether or not it contains negative sentiment attacking a certain candidate. 
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The data, in the form of voice recording of Irama’s sermon, were transcribed, so that 
it can be categorized and managed with other text data. The text data were, then, identified, 
categorized into themes, and translated.  
There were two processes that I would like to understand. First is to understand the 
social representations of the Chinese as the other and how it was used to attack the Chinese 
candidate. In this process, I concentrated on analyzing the contents of Rhoma Irama’s sermon 
in how he describes the Chinese candidate which lead to the view that a Chinese is not fit to 
be a leader of Jakarta. 
Second is to understand a construction process of a “new” social representation of 
how religious teaching is represented to have nothing to do with negative sentiment or hatred. 
In this process, I used statements from Rhoma Irama and his supporters (see data collection 




In this section, I present our analysis results in two discursive themes, which I have 
titled “Having a Chinese leader is a humiliation” and “Delivering God’s words: Obligation 
has nothing to do with hatred.” The first theme focuses on discussing Rhoma Irama’s sermon. 
Here I demonstrate evidence that his sermon contains negative messages.  In the second 
theme, I show Rhoma Irama and his supporters’ rhetoric that the sermon contains religious 
teaching per se. 
 
Having a Chinese Leader Is a Humiliation 
 
As most native Indonesians are Muslims, a mosque is regarded as a strategic place to 
deliver propaganda and to persuade other Muslims (see e.g., Moghaddam, 2006, 2008). In the 
mosque, Quranic verses are exploited to reinforce ideas related to Muslim life. By taking an 
advantage of his position as a religious figure, Rhoma Irama utilized the mosque to deliver an 
idea that Islam does not acknowledge a non-Muslim to be a leader for Muslims. In this 
regard, to strengthen his view, he backed his sermon with a Quranic verse. His sermon in Al 
Isra Mosque on 29 July 2012 said: 
 
Memilih pemimpin bukan hanya soal politik […] tapi sudah termasuk 
ibadah… (lalu membaca ayat  dan mengartikannya) Hai orang-orang yang 
beriman, jangan sekali-sekali kau mengangkat seorang pemimpin dari orang-
orang kafir di samping orang-orang yang beriman… Apakah kamu mau 
membuka peluang bagi Allah untuk menghukum kamu? Ini sanksi kalau kita 
memilih pemimpin yang non-Muslim […] kalau kita memilih pemimpin yang 
non-Muslim maka sanksinya adalah mendapat azab dari Allah SWT. (RI 1) 
 
[Choosing a leader is not about politics […] but also a spiritual 
call/devotion… (then he chants a Quran verse and translates it) Let not the 
believers take the disbelievers as Auliya (supporter, helper, leader, etc) instead 
of the believers… Do you want Allah to punish you? This is a sanction for us 
when we choose a non-Muslim leader […] and whoever does that will receive 
Allah’s punishment. (see Quran: 2; 28 for a complete version of the verse). (RI 
1) 
 
The excerpt above is the introduction of Rhoma Irama’s sermon. He reminds the audience 
that choosing a leader is part of devotion where it is clearly explained in the Quran. Using 
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Quranic verses, he stresses that believers, which refer to Muslims, shall not take a non-
Muslim as a leader due to Allah’s sanctions and punishment. For information, refusing a non-
Muslim to be a leader is not a case found only in Indonesia. A study conducted by Hopkins 
and Kahani-Hopkins (2004) also shows how Muslims living in the UK used the Quranic 
verses to reject participating in the 1997 General Election. It can be noted here that there is a 
notion in some Muslims that having a non-Muslim leader will lead them to a wrong path, that 
is, ending up doing what is forbidden by Islamic law. 
As the sermon continues, Rhoma Irama implies that having a non-Muslim as a leader 
will create a scourge for Jakarta.  
 
Kalau sudah Ahok yang seorang non pribumi menjadi Gubernur di Jakarta 
Ibukota Indonesia, martabat bangsa tergadaikan, citra bangsa tercabik-cabik. 
(RI 1) 
 
[If Ahok who is a non-indigenous becomes a Governor of Jakarta which is the 
capital city of Indonesia, then the nation’s dignity is degraded and ripped 
apart]. (RI 1)   
 
In the excerpt above, Rhoma Irama describes that Ahok is different than the indigenous 
Muslims. Here, the word “non-indigenous,” referring to Ahok’s background, is used to stress 
that Ahok cannot be treated equally to indigenous groups. That is, his status is considered 
lower than the indigenous groups. In doing so, Rhoma Irama feels that Ahok will degrade the 
nation’s dignity when he becomes Jakarta’s leader. This indicates that the Chinese entities are 
considered unfit with Indonesian values and characteristics.  
Similar cases, where a majority-dominant group degrades minority groups, can also 
be found in other countries. For example, immigrants in England (see Howarth, 2009) and 
Black and Jews in Germany (see Holtz & Wagner, 2009) shared the same experience of 
having been degenerated out from the national identity. It is simply because their values and 
characteristics are believed to be incompatible with the national identity. 
Rhoma Irama continues his arguments, explaining why Muslims should not vote for 
Ahok.  
 
Kalau sudah seorang Kristen memimpin Ibukota Jakarta, negara yang 
mayoritas Muslim ini maka umat Islam menanggung aib besar di mata dunia 
internasional, Innalillahi. Saya tahu banyak umat Islam yang mengidolakan 
Jokowi, saya tahu betul […] karena memang beliau orangnya, menurut mereka 
(dia) sabar, santun, ini, itu, idola banget,deh. Tapi inget Jokowi hanya batu 
loncatan. Yang  nanti akan berkuasa adalah Ahok yang non-Muslim, Ahok 
yang Cina, Ahok yang Kristen, inalillahi, naudzubillah min dzalik. (RI 1) 
 
[If a Christian (referring to Ahok’s religion) leads the capital city Jakarta 
which has Muslim as the majority, then followers of Islam bear the disgrace in 
the eyes of the international world, Innalillahi (Arabic word, meaning ‘oh, my 
God’). I know that a lot of Muslims idolize Jokowi, and I know that exactly 
[…] because he is really the man who is known to be patient and polite, and 
this is what makes him overwhelmingly idolized. But remember, Jokowi is 
only a stepping stone. Later, Ahok who is a non-Muslim, who is a Chinese, 
who is a Christian, will be the real ruler. Innalilahi, naudzubillah min dzalik 
(Oh my God, we seek refuge in God from that)]. (RI 1)  
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In the excerpt above, once again, Rhoma Irama describes how Ahok is different from other 
indigenous. He emphasizes that Ahok is different not just because he is a Chinese but also as 
a non-Muslim. In addition, in Indonesia, the word “Innalilahi” is usually used when Muslims 
get news related to tragedies such as death, car crash, earthquake, etc. In English, “Innalilahi” 
can be synonymous with “Alas” where it is usually used for expressions of grief, pity, or 
concern.  While “naudzubillah min dzalik” is usually used when a Muslim encounters a bad 
situation and prays to God to be shunned from that situation. It can be understood here that 
having a non-Muslim leader in a place where Muslims are the majority will create: (1) a 
disgrace to the nation, (2) a tragedy for Muslims, and (3) a bad situation for Muslims. 
Nevertheless, Roma Irama also implies that a position as a vice governor is only a stepping 
stone for Ahok. Here, we assume that Rhoma Irama feels that being a vice governor is not a 
non-Muslim’s main goal. Vice governor is considered as a stepping stone for Ahok in 
reaching the true goal, that is, becoming a governor.   
In the closing of Rhoma Irama’s sermon, he asks the audience to further deliver his 
message to all Muslims living in Jakarta in an effort to protect Jakarta from the grip of non-
indigenous and non-Muslim. As he said in his closing sermon: 
 
Mohon hal ini disampaikan kepada semua orang Islam yang tidak hadir di 
sini, pada saudara kita, tetangga kita, teman-teman kita… Semoga Jakarta 
dilindungi oleh Allah SWT dari cengkereman non-pribumi, dari cengkeraman 
non-Muslim (RI 1)    
 
[Please convey this to every Muslim who do not attend here, to our relatives, 
our neighbors, our friends… May Allah protect Jakarta from non-Indigenous 
grip, and from non-Muslim grip] (RI 1). 
 
In the excerpt above, Rhoma Irama hopes that the audience will convey his message to every 
Muslims in order to protect Jakarta from non-indigenous and non-Muslims. It is a clear 
statement from Rhoma Irama that there is no (strategic) place for a non-Muslim in Jakarta. 
The use of “non-indigenous grip” and “non-Muslim grip” in the sermon may refer to an 
understanding that Muslim activities will be controlled by a non-Muslim. Hence, Rhoma 
Irama may think that Muslims will not benefit from voting for Ahok as they will fall into the 
grip of a non-Muslim.  
 Overall, based on our analyses, the use of “innalillahi, naudzubillahi mindzalik,” 
“disgrace to the nation,” “non-indigenous grip,” “non-Muslim grip” are examples of negative 
sentiments or resentment toward a non-Muslim Chinese contained in the sermon. However, 
this was denied by Rhoma Irama.  
 
Delivering God’s Words: Obligation Has Nothing to Do with Hatred 
 
In Indonesia, showing negative sentiments and hostility toward a certain ethnic or 
religious group in public is forbidden. Because of his sermon, which contains rejection of a 
candidate based on ethnicity and religion, Rhoma Irama was summoned by the Election 
Supervisory Committee (Panwaslu) on 1 August 2012 to give a clarification about his 
sermon. Rhoma Irama was alleged over the hate propaganda against the Chinese candidate 
(Budiman & Perdana, 2012).  About a week after his sermon, on 6 August 2012, Rhoma 
Irama came to comply with the summon. He stated that he was not guilty because what he did 
was a religious sermon where the statement of rejecting non-Musim leader is clearly 
explained in the Quran.  
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Rhoma Irama strongly declined the accusation that he had spread hatred toward a 
certain religion and ethnic group. As reported by Afifah from Kompas News (2012), in the 
interview on August, 3, 2012, Rhoma Irama states that: 
 
Saya menyampaikan firman Allah di rumah Allah. Apakah hal itu salah? Saya 
hanya menyampaikan kebenaran... Jika umat Islam memilih pemimpin yang 
kafir, maka mereka akan menjadi musuh Allah... Saya yakin kebenaran ayat 
al-Quran. Jadi saya tidak takut menyampaikannya. Saya wajib menyampaikan 
kebenaran. Bagaimana jika banyak umat Islam yang menjadi musuh Allah? 
(RI 2) 
 
[ I was just delivering God’s words in the House of God. Is it wrong? I was 
just telling the truth... If Muslims choose an infidel (kufr) as their leader, they 
will become the enemies of God... I believe in the truth of the Quranic verses. 
It is my obligation to deliver the truth. What if many Muslims become the 
enemies of God?]. (RI 2) 
 
In the excerpt above, according to Rhoma Irama,  Ahok is considered as a kufr or an infidel. 
It is important to note here that the word “infidel” was not used by Rhoma Irama in his 
sermon. Hence, Ahok has another label or attribute other than a Chinese, a Christian, or a 
non-Muslim, namely as an infidel. The excerpt describes that Rhoma Irama believes that 
rejection to candidates who are non-Muslim, Christian, Chinese, or infidel has nothing to do 
with negative sentiment toward a certain group. He has a belief that delivering God’s 
messages in the House of God (i.e., mosque) will relief him from the accusation of 
propagating negative sentiment.   
Moreover, during Rhoma Irama’s interrogation in Panwaslu office, due to accusation 
of his negative sentiment, there was a demonstration rallying outside the building in an 
attempt to give support to Rhoma Irama (Alvin, 2012; Wibowo, 2012). As reported by Alvin 
from Centro One news (2012), Wibowo from Tempo news (2012), and Affandi from Viva 
news (2012), outside the Panwaslu building, hundreds of demonstrators raised banners of 
various messages in support of Rhoma Irama. At the same time, there were also banners 
displayed to support Rhoma Irama at some street corners around Jakarta (see Figure 1 as an 
example). 
 
Figure 1: Two banners displayed in the street corners of Jakarta and one banner displayed on 
the crossing bridge with the picture of Rhoma Irama with the words jangan teror ustad dan 
ulama (Do not terrorize cleric and religious figure) and jangan sakiti ulama kami (do not hurt 
our cleric) (sources retrieved from Sazli, 2012; Rima News, 2012; and twicsy.com, 2012). 
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As seen in figure 1, 2, and 3, referring to the remarks pointed out by the 
demonstrators and the statements displayed on the banners, it seems that the main issue  
being addressed is religion. The rejection, due to the candidate’s Chinese ethnicity, was not 
explicitly addressed. In fact, there were no banners informing that the demonstrators reject 
Ahok because he is a non-Muslim Chinese. Here, Ahok who is a Chinese, is perceived as the 
“other” because his religion is different from that of the indigenous majority. Accordingly, 
such banners, which showed support for Rhoma Irama, highlighted the issue of religion as the 
main reason for rejecting Ahok. The following statements support the explanation above:  
 
Jangan terror ustad dan Ulama. 
[Do not terrorize the clerics and religious figures]  
 
Bang Haji! Maju terus dalam menegakkan agama Allah! Allahu Akbar… 
Allahu Akbar!  
[Bang Haji (Rhoma Irama’s nickname)! Keep moving in defending Allah’s 
religion! Allahu Akbar… Allahu Akbar!]  
 
[…] Kami siap dibelakang mu hingga tetesan darah terakhir.   
[We will back you until the last drop of blood]  
 
Jangalah orang-orang Mukmin memilih pemimpin yang bukan dari orang-
orang mukmin. Barang siapa berbuat demikian Allah SWT tidak akan 
menolongnya kecuali tidak ada orang-orang mukmin. Allah SWT 
memperingatkan kamu terhadap siksaanNya karena kepadaNya kamu kembali 
 
[Let not the believers take the disbelievers as Auliya (supporter, helper, leader, 
etc) instead of the believers, and whoever does that will never be helped by 
Allah in any way, except if you indeed fear a danger from them. And Allah 
warns you against Himself (his punishment), and to Allah is the final return]. 
(Quran: 2; 28)  
 
The messages above indicate that the main issue for refusing Ahok’s candidacy as a Vice 
Governor of Jakarta is due to his non-Muslim identity.  
 
Figure 2: Demonstrators display a banner showing the words Bang Haji! Maju terus dalam 
menegakkan agama Allah! Allahu Akbar..Allahu akbar (Bang Haji (Rhoma Irama’s nick 
name)! keep moving in straightening Allah’s religion! Allahu Akbar… Allahu Akbar!) 
(source retrieved from Affandi, 2012). 
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Figure 3: Demonstrators displaying a banner containing Quranic verses (source retrieved 




Shortly, after conducting investigations, on 13 August 2012 Panwaslu recalled its 
charge to Rhoma Irama. They reported that there was no evidence which supported the 
accusation that Rhoma Irama’s sermon spread hatred toward a certain ethnic and religion 
(Aziza, 2012).   For this, Abdul Rasyid Abdullah Syafi’i, on behalf of 11 clerics who 
supported Rhoma Irama, expressed his gratitude. As reported by Ratna from Islam Pos news 
(2012), the clerics stated that RhomaIrama’s sermon has nothing to do with any “hidden” 
political campaigns. According to them, Rhoma Irama was solely explaining the criteria of a 
leader according to Islamic perspective.  Indeed, the clerics demanded Panwaslu to stop 
accusing clerics of propagating negative sentiments, asserting that propagation is not part of 
clerics’ religious activities. Abdul Rasyid Abdullah Syafi’i clearly states:   
 
Kami minta Panwaslu DKI tidak menakut-nakuti para ulama, yang 
memberikan ceramah dengan isu SARA3. Ulama dan Habib hanya 
menyampaikan bagaimana kepemimpinan dalam pandangan Islam, jangan 
kaitkan dengan SARA” (ARAS 1). 
 
[We ask Panwaslu DKI to stop frightening clerics with accusation of 
propagating ethnicity, religion, race, and intergroup (abbreviated as SARA in 
Indonesia language) issues. Clerics and preachers only explain the meaning of 
leadership in Islamic perspective, so please do not relate this to ethnicity, 
religion, race, and intergroup issues] (ARAS 1). 
 
In the excerpt above, Syafi’i implies that accusation of propagating ethnic, religion, race, or 
intergroup sentiments have scared clerics. Clerics have the duties of delivering religious 
messages; therefore, sermons delivered by clerics are not related to negative sentiment 
toward a certain group. In line with the statements from Syafi’i, one member of National 
                                                 
3 In Indonesia it is called as SARA issue, which is the acronym of suku (ethnic), agama (religion), ras (race), 
and antargolongan (intergroup). 
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Commission of Human Rights, Saharudin Daming describes that Rhoma Irama’s sermon 
does not contain discriminative messages.  
 
Mari kita tempatkan segala sesuatu secara  proporsional objektif, jelas, dan 
bebas dari intrik. Harus dilakukan investigasi secara menyeluruh lepas dari 
berbagai kepentingan dari orang-orang yang sedang bertarung. Bahwa Bang 
Haji melontarkan pernyataan yang oleh pihak lain merasa sebagai sesuatu 
yang diskriminatif, saya pikir itu tidak adil. Karena apa yang dilakukan Bang 
Haji pada konteks keislaman adalah sesuatu yang tidak sekedar menjadi 
kewajiban bagi dirinya, tapi juga untuk semua umat muslim karena itu adalah 
petikan ayat dalam Al Qur’an dan diperkuat dalam hadis bahwa kita dalam 
memilh pemimpin punya kriteria…. Semua kelompok agama apapun pasti 
juga punya kriteria... Maka ketika Rhoma membuat kriteria pemimpin 
menurut keyakinannya adalah suatu yang sah dan tidak perlu dipersoalkan. 
Tapi ketika Rhoma tampil dalam khutbah untuk mengajak pemimpin Islam, 
apa yang salah? Sebagai pribadi Muslim saya kira kita terikat dengan hal itu, 
bukan hanya Rhoma… Itu semua adalah bagian dari kebebasan menjalankan 
ibadah, itu kan dijamin undang-undang. Tentu hal-hal seperti ini harus 
dibebaskan dari intrik-intrik politik. Rhoma Irama melakukan itu kan tidak 
sebagai intrik politik, dia hanya menjaga gawang. (SD 1) 
 
[Let us put everything in proportion, objective, clear and free from intrigue. 
There has to be a thorough investigation free from interests of the contesting 
parties. That Bang Haji’s remarks is felt by other party as discriminative, I 
believe it is unfair. Because what Bang Haji did in the context of Islam is not 
only obligatory to him, rather it also applies to other Muslims because it is an 
excerpt from the verses in the Qur’an and strengthened in the hadist, that in 
choosing a leader there are certain criteria... All religious groups also have 
their own criteria... Thus when Rhoma creates a criteria for a leader according 
to his belief then it is valid and does not have to be disputed. But when Rhoma 
appears in his sermon to persuade an Islamic leader, what is so wrong? As a 
Muslim we are bound by it, not just Rhoma... All of these are part of freedom 
to worship, it is protected by the law. Of course all of these issues should be 
free of political intrigue. What Rhoma did is not part of political intrigue, he is 
acting as a gate keeper.] (SD 1) 
 
In the excerpt above, Daming describes that Rhoma Irama is not guilty in persuading 
Muslims to vote only for Muslim candidates. It is not wrong for Rhoma Irama to have a 
leader model derived from his faith. Since Rhoma Irama is a Muslim, he has an obligation to 
convey, what he believes as the truth. According to Daming, what Rhoma Irama did is part of 
worship. He argues that other religions will do the same as what Rhoma Irama did. Thus, 
Daming thinks that it is the right of every religious people to perform their religious worship. 
In this section I have reported a process of how a “rhetorical” representation about 
religion was used to tackle accusation of negative sentiment. It demonstrates a social 
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Discussion 
 
The present study provides evidence that being labeled as the “other” (non-Muslim 
and non-indigenous), a Chinese is perceived to be unfit to become Jakarta’s leader as he may 
disgrace the nation. I have tried to reveal that Rhoma Irama’s sermon contains messages with 
negative sentiment. It can be seen through the use of “disgrace of the nation” and 
“innalillahi” in his sermon.   
 The present findings also reveal how delivering religious doctrines are represented to 
have nothing to do with negative sentiment or hatred toward a certain group. This relatively 
“new” representation has been popularized and seems to be socially well-constructed by 
Rhoma Irama and his supporters. By using the Quranic verses to support his argument for 
rejecting a Chinese candidate, Rhoma Irama could escape from the accusation of spreading a 
negative sentiment. According to Rhoma Irama, it is not him who rejects non-Muslim leaders 
but the Quran, and it is his obligation as a Muslim to deliver such rejection. He has, then, 
considerably succeeded in constructing this new representation. In this regard, we believe that 
now some Muslims in Indonesia may have a social representation that delivering God’s 
messages have nothing to do with hatred. As a consequence, this representation may be 
strongly used by other Muslim politicians as a tool to tackle other non-Muslim opponents.   
 In social psychology, how obligation is used as a tool to avoid a wrongdoing is not a 
new phenomenon. In the case of the Jewish holocaust in World War 2, many of the Nazi 
soldiers who went to trial stated that they did the killings not because of hatred toward the 
Jews, but because they were just following order (see Milgram, 1974). Following order is a 
form of obligation for military members, which in the case of the holocaust, the military 
members used that to try to escape from responsibilities of wrongdoings. 
In relation to prejudice issues, denial of racism and using negative comments can be 
found in many societies around the world in varied forms (Nelson, 2013; van Dijk, 1992). In 
short, its intention is to avoid, minimize, or defend from being labeled as racist or prejudiced. 
So far, to the best of my knowledge, such denial of using religious elements is considered a 
novel phenomenon which has not been reported before. So far, the present study has found 
that in Indonesia accepting that delivering God’s messages do not relate to negative 
sentiments have reduced the description for hate speech and prejudice. This in turn has 
worrying implication in reducing prejudice and intergroup hostilities.  
In able to understand how religious teachings cannot be considered to be related to 
hatred, we have to understand how religion is perceived by Indonesians, in particular among 
the majority Muslims. Generally, religion is a very important element to Indonesians. This is 
a key element in being an Indonesian, which is being a person with a belief in God. In 
Indonesia, religious people are represented as morally good. As I described in the 
introduction that in common knowledge, often being religious is categorized as being good, 
or even undeniably saintly. Therefore I expected that this explains why not relating religious 
sermon to hatred is accepted as reasonable.  
In this regard, let us take a look at the study conducted by Billig (2001) about jokes. 
By analyzing three websites that present racist humours, Billig revealed that the disclaimers 
from the websites informing that the contents are just a joke are not just a joke. It was 
described that putting a joke by relating black people to apes cannot be considered as merely 
a joke because apes in a discourse are often used as symbol for stupidity and backwardness. 
On this matter, Billig showed that the perception that a joke is always a joke and not related 
to racism can be used by racists to dehumanize outgroup members without being worried of 
moral sanctions.  
A word that is used in a communication relates to a meaning about a social object. 
The word “negro” to refer black people in the West countries is meant as an insult 
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(Philogѐne, 2001). Today, the use of “negro” is forbidden by law. What is allowed is the use 
of “African American” which is considered to bring a positive meaning. In relation to 
Indonesian context, how religion relates to a positive meaning can also be shown in how 
religious symbols are used by politicians. To look religious, many politicians utilized fashion 
or clothes linking to images of religious people. For example is a Muslim politician wearing 
peci (Muslim hat). Given these eexplanations, now we can understand why an idea that 
religious sermon is not related to hatred can be understood to be reasonable. 
In order to alleviate this “negative” representation, I suggest finding an alternative 
explanation of how religion can be used to confirm hatred. Re-interpretation of religious 
scriptures can be a useful tool to challenge the arguments that “religion has nothing to do 
with negative sentiments.” As religious teaching has many interpretations and school of 
thoughts, I assume that how Muslims should perceive or behave toward other believers have 
multiple interpretations as well.   
Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins’ (2004) study regarding British Muslims’ political 
activity is a good example in the discussion about non-Muslim leader. It was reported that 
Muslims living in UK had two main interpretations regarding the 1997 general election. One 
rejected the election, while others participated. Those who supported the election said that 
“As Muslims we have a duty to promote what is good and beneficial and try to prevent what 
is bad and harmful to individuals in society… As citizens of Britain, our duty is the same as 
our duty as Muslims” (Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2004, pp. 347-348). He argued that 
Yusuf (one of the prophet living in Egypt at the time of Pharaoh) “did not wait for the ruler 
and people to renounce their paganism before acting. He moved swiftly and served the 
people, fulfilling their essential needs and rescuing them from starvation” (Hopkins & 
Kahani-Hopkins, 2004, p. 348). Given this illustration, it seems possible to deliver and 
construct a religious message containing positive description about other groups in Indonesia. 
I argue that finding and using prominent Islamic leaders in mobilizing tolerant religious 
messages can make the representations of religious tolerance more effective. In this regard, I 
suggest further study to focus on how such new social representation or understanding can be 
accepted and replace the old social representation.      
Furthermore, I also propose another way to overcome negative representation toward 
the Chinese, that is, by deconstructing the shared representation of history (Liu & Hamilton, 
2005) narration of Indonesia. In Indonesia, the involvement of the Chinese in building the 
nation is highly neglected and blurred, where historically the Chinese are considered to have 
a strong influence (Setiono, 2002). It is important to note here that this is the case for non-
Muslim Chinese and not for Muslim Chinese. Usually, Muslim Chinese will be perceived 
more positively and are accepted by indigenous Muslims. I believe that exposing such 
national events and cultural life in Indonesia, where the Chinese are perceived to be involved, 
may create a positive shared representation of history between the Chinese and the 
indigenous groups.  
I assume that when most groups have a common representation about Indonesian 
history, they will be perceived as part of a common identity. This is possible because history 
can become a connecting bridge (Liu, Lawrence, Ward, & Abraham, 2002) between 
collective identities. In doing so, further study need to be conducted in order to understand 
when and how building a shared representation is feasible and can successfully create a 
common identity. 
Nevertheless, some limitations of the present study need to be addressed. First, the 
present study concentrated in the sequential events in Jakarta’s gubernatorial election 
campaign in tackling a non-Muslim Chinese candidate. I do not yet know whether or not such 
rejection occurs to non-Muslim indigenous. What I can predict is that there will be a negative 
reaction from the majority groups toward a minority candidate. Second, my study is about 
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political involvement of a minority group and how their involvement is responded by the 
majority in Jakarta, Indonesia. As it has been reported, there was a negative response. I 
assume this negative response is not unique to Indonesia. It is therefore good to know, for 
example, of what will happen when a Turk is involved as a presidential candidate in 
European countries or a Chinese involved as a presidential candidate in Australia or in New 
Zealand? Studying this issue is important in order to find the solution for the minority 
rejection problems.    
In conclusion, this study suggests that when a negative representation of a minority 
group is found, this negative represention can be a useful tool for politicians. Religious 
elements can be used to deflect accusation of negative sentiments against a certain group. 
Religion is socially represented to always relate to something positive or sacred. To the best 
of my knowledge, this representation only starts to exist after it was enacted and contested in 
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